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The Agency Form in Tax Shelter
Investments: A Viable Alternative
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the benefits of tax sheltered investments are the defer-
ral of income taxes on other income through large deductions in
the first few years and the possible conversion of ordinary income
to capital gain on disposition of the investment.' The form most
commonly used for the tax shelter has been the limited partner-
ship.2 It is particularly well suited because it provides limited lia-
1. See generally RIT HAFT & P. FASS, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMIENTS, 4A SECURITIES
LAW SERIES (2d ed. 1974); 2 W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrmiRE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS ch. 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
McKEE]; 2 A. WILLIs, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION chs. 59-67 (2d ed. 1976); Leder,
Tax Shelter Reform, in 22D ANN. TAX CoNF., C. OF WILIAm & MARY 151, 153
(1977); Tannenbaum, Leverage Shelter Operations: Oil & Gas, Motion Pic-
tures and Other Theatrical Shelters, 31 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 777 (1973).
2. In order to assure limited liability for all investors, a limited partnership may
be formed with a corporation as the sole general partner. The corporation is
typically formed specifically for its role as general partner in the specific in-
vestment by the promoter(s) and will have only minimal capitalization. The
Service, in Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, has attempted to limit this scheme
somewhat by requiring, for advance ruling purposes, that a corporate general
partner have at least a one percent interest at all times "in each material item
of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction or credit." A previous revenue
procedure, Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735 imposes four other requirements
for ruling purposes, which are: (1) the limited partners must not own more
than 20% of the stock of the corporate general partner; (2) the corporate gen-
eral partner must have a net worth at all times equal to a specified percentage
of the aggregate contributions to the partnership; (3) the purchase of a lim-
ited partnership interest must not require or provide an option to purchase
any security of the corporate general partner; and (4) the limited partnership
must be organized under an appropriate state partnership statute. See gener-
ally Mann, Rev. Proc. 74-17 Diminishes Chances of Favorable Ruling on Lim-
ited Partnership, 42 J. TAX. 16 (1975); Weller, Limited Partnerships with
Corporate General Partners: Beyond Rev. Proc. 72-13, 36 J. TAx. 306 (1972);
Note, Limited Partnership-Limited Control Through a Corporate General
Partner, 53 WASH. L. REV. 775 (1978). For a general discussion of limited part-
nerships in tax shelter investments, see Friedberg, Limited Partnerships: A
Non-Tax Analysis, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1363 (1974); Lee, Tax Shelters
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 22 ViLL. L. REv. 223 (1976-77); Sperling &
Lokken, The Limited Partnership Tax Shelter: An Investment Vehicle Under
Attack, 29 U. FLA. L REv. 1 (1976); Stiss, Limited Partnerships; The IRS At-
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bility for the investor while the tax benefits pass through to the
partners. There are, however, alternative forms which can provide
substantially the same results. 3 This comment compares one such
alternative, the agency contract, with the more typical partnership
agreement, analyzing the agency relationship from both the opera-
tional and tax viewpoints.
I. AGENCY IN TAX SHELTER
A. Why the Agency Form is Selected
One of the reasons for using an agency agreement is that the
promoter is only willing to involve investors on that basis. Typi-
cally, the promoter will have special skills in a particular invest-
ment area, such as oil and gas, cattle or equipment leasing. He will
be a "known commodity" in his particular field and may not want
to give up his individuality by forming a partnership. More impor-
tantly, he will not want to subject himself to unlimited liability as a
general operating partner in a limited partnership.4 Nonetheless,
he will typically desire to restrict the rights of investors so as to
minimize any interference with the operation of the investment
venture.
Other reasons for choosing the agency form include avoidance
of the application of securities laws.5 If significant duties are allo-
cated to the principal, the agency may not be regarded as a "secur-
ity" since the profits will not be due solely to the efforts of others. 6
tack on Tax Shelters, 6 TAX ADVISOR 659 (1975); Taft, Limited Partnership,
174 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1975).
3. Other forms which can be used include a sole proprietorship and a corpora-
tion electing Subchapter S status under I.R.C. § 1372. See generally B. Brrr-
KER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 6.01, at 6-1 (3d ed. 1971); 2 MCKEE, supra note 1, 2.02(3).
4. This assumes that the promoter does not decide to incorporate or cannot
safely meet the requirements of Rev. Procs. 74-17 and 72-13. See note 2 supra.
5. If the securities laws are applicable, then the agency must register under
both federal and state law, unless it qualifies under one of the applicable ex-
emptions. Failure to properly comply under federal law could result in a civil
suit by the investors for damages and recission and potential criminal liabil-
ity. Similar penalties are also imposed at the state level. See generally R.
HAr & P. FAss, supra note 1, ch. 2.
6. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1) (1976)) defines
"Security" broadly to include, among other things, an "investment contract,"
1participation in any profit-sharing agreement" and a 'fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights .... " The Supreme Court in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) held that an investment contract "means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party ... ." Id. at 298-99. On this basis, where there is no
active participation in the management or control of the venture by the inves-
tor, the investment will constitute a security. Since a limited investor in a
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Also, an agency may be used where the promoter does not want to
make a personal cash investment. The promoter can receive a re-
turn on the investor's money through compensation payments.7
Finally, an agency may be selected on the basis that it affords a
great deal of flexibility in meeting the tax and risk objectives of the
investor.8 If the investor dies or his objectives change, the terms of
the agency relationship are simply altered to meet those needs. If
the investor was in a partnership with a number of partners, the
risks and tax objectives of the whole partnership could not be
changed to meet the needs of one partner and the only alternative
would be to sell the interest.
B. How is the Agency Formed?
Although an agency relationship can be created through appar-
ent9 or inherent authority' 0 or by the ratification of acts," the tax
shelter agency should be formalized in a written agreement which
grants the promoter express authority.' 2 The agency should be set
up with a specific investment goal such as oil and gas. The techni-
cal language peculiar to oil and gas should then be carefully de-
fined in order to familiarize the investor with the terms of the trade
while giving effect to the intent of the parties within the framework
of the investment. As an example, where the promoter is compen-
limited partnership may not participate in the management of the business
under Article 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a security would ex-
ist due to the reliance on third parties. See McGreghar Land Co. v. Meguiar,
521 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1975). With an agency relationship, however, the inves-
tor-principal does have the right to participate in the decision-making proc-
ess. In addition, the principal has the ultimate power of discharge over the
agent at any time and for any reason. It could also be argued as a policy
matter that the securities laws were not meant to cover an agency in which
there is a one-on-one relationship with the agent being subject to the control
and discretion of the investor-principal. Overall, although the substance of
the relationship will control, since it has been recognized that a general part-
nership interest in a limited partnership will probably not qualify as a secur-
ity, it would appear that an agency relationship would have even a stronger
argument against the classification as a security. See generally R. HAFT & P.
FASS, supra note 1, § 2.02; L. Loss, SECUIrrES REGULATON 483 (2d ed. 1961); 2
A. Witus, supra note 1, ch. 66; Aslanides, Cardinali, Haynsworth, Lane &
Niesar, Limited Partnerships-What's Next and What's Left;, 34 Bus. LAw.
257, 273 (1978).
7. See § II-B of text infra.
8. A partnership will offer equal flexibility if the promoter agrees to be the gen-
eral partner in a limited partnership.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT].
10. Id. § 8A.
11. Id. § 82.
12. Id. § 11.
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sated on a percentage of cash flow, 13 a clear understanding of this
term is dependent upon an explanation of the types of expendi-
tures which will be subtracted from receipts such as lifting costs,
production payments and delay rentals, and the drilling expendi-
tures incurred on exploratory wells. Since the principal is di-
recting the agent to take certain actions, the agreement should be
as complete as possible with regard to the technical requirements
of the investment.
The business should be described with a statement of foresee-
able uses of the agency's capital. This provision will clarify the un-
derstanding of the parties and will protect the promoter-agent
from claims that he is operating outside the scope of the agree-
ment. Such claims could arise because the law of agency imposes
a duty on the investment manager to act within the terms of the
agency agreement. 14 Also, by stating the purpose of the invest-
ment and the specific intent of the investor, the agreement will re-
flect the often speculative nature of the investment and will
authorize the agent to take the requisite business risks on behalf
of the investor-principal.
The agent should be appointed for a stated term and his author-
ity and limitations should be enumerated. Common restrictions
on the scope of authority include acts in contravention of the
agreement, confessions of judgment, disposition of the investment,
borrowing funds in excess of a stated amount, and investing in
property which is not specifically described in the agreement with-
out the consent of the investor.
The promoter will normally enter into a number of similar
agency investment agreements. Thus, the agreement should pro-
vide that the agent has the permission of the investor-principal to
enter into such other business ventures. Absent this provision,
agency law provides that an agent as a fiduciary'5 has an obligation
of loyalty and an implied duty not to compete with the principal. 16
The agency can be terminated in a number of ways. An agency
is a consensual relation for the benefit of the investor-principal,
and can be terminated by any stated event or change in circum-
13. See notes 22-29 & accompanying text infra.
14. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 385 provides that "Unless otherwise agreed, an
agent is subject to a duty to obey all reasonable directions in regard to the
manner of performing a service that he has contracted to perform."
15. Id. § 1 (1958).
16. As a fiduciary, the agent has a duty of loyalty, which implies a duty not to
compete unless he has the consent of the principal. Id. § 394. However, the
agent does have to act fairly between the principals and he must disclose all
facts which "would reasonably affect the judgment" of the principals in their
decision regarding the competing arrangement. Id. § 392.
[Vol. 59:85
TAX SHELTER INVESTMENTS
stances,' 7 or by lapse of time.18 Similarly, termination will result
where the principal or agent dies19 or becomes bankrupt.20 Practi-
cally, the agency agreement should be limited to a specified period
of time as determined by the expected life of the particular invest-
ment. In addition to a stated time for termination, the agreement
should specify the events causing dissolution of the relationship.
Common provisions include the withdrawal or bankruptcy of the
agent, the sale of the investment and the written request of the
owner or the expiration of the stated term of the agreement.
Once the methods of termination are agreed upon, two other
factors should be resolved in the agreement. First, the agreement
should provide instructions on how the assets of the agency are to
be distributed upon dissolution. Often, the agent will insist on a
percentage share of the investment which may range from five to
fifteen percent. In this event, the investor should consider making
the dissolution interest contingent on a stated worth of the invest-
ment and provide for a forfeiture if dissolution results from an act
of the agent such as a breach of the agreement or bankruptcy. A
second consideration is the protection of the promoter-agent on
termination of the agency relationship. The promoter should make
it economically disadvantageous for the investor-principal to "fire"
him for a period of time after he has set up the investment. Other-
wise, the investor could wait until the promoter has utilized his
talents in putting the deal together and then terminate the rela-
tionship at the probable cost of only the agreed upon compensa-
tion up to that point.2' Accordingly, the agent should insist that it
17. Id. § 38, Comment (b).
18. Id.
19. Subject to two exceptions relating to banking transactions, the principal's
death automatically terminates the authority of the agent. Id. § 120 (1958).
Similarly, the authority terminates upon the death of the agent. Id. § 121.
20. Id. § 113 provides that-
the bankruptcy or insolvency of an agent terminates his authority to
conduct transactions in which the state of his credit would so affect
the interests of the principal that the agent should infer that the prin-
cipal, if he knew the facts, would not consent to the further exercise
of the authority.
Comment (b) explains that the bankruptcy of the agent "may not be of im-
portance to the principal, and even if it is of some importance, it may not be
of such great importance as to prevent the agent from dealing with third per-
sons or completing transactions which he has been authorized to conduct for
the principal."
Section 114 states that where the agent has notice, the bankruptcy of the
principal will terminate "his authority as to transactions which he should in-
fer the principal no longer consents to have conducted for him."
21. The Restatement provides that in the situation where there is a lump sum
payment to the agent upon completion of the transaction, such as a real es-
tate broker, then the agent will be entitled to the full amount of the agreed
compensation where the agency is terminated without justification if the
1980]
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be stated in the agreement that if the agency is terminated within
a stated period by the investor, the promoter would be entitled to
the future agreed compensation over the life of the investment, or
to a stated separation payment.
An important characteristic of the agency relationship is the
flexibility afforded the parties in structuring the agent's compensa-
tion.22 One alternative is to pay the agent a flat management fee.
Typically the agent-promoter will not agree to this method of com-
pensation because if the agent has special skills, he will want to
share in the anticipated profits which will result from his exper-
tise. Similarly, it will not be in the principal's interest to agree to a
flat fee, because he should provide a dollar incentive for the agent
to use his best efforts to make the investment profitable. For these
reasons, the agent should be compensated on a straight percentage
of "cash flow" (which will generally equal "net profits") or on a
varying percentage which increases as the investor's initial invest-
ment is recovered. Under this varying percentage method, the
agent will be paid a percentage of profits as a management fee un-
til the investment is recovered. The agent will then receive the
same fee plus an incentive management fee which can increase up
to certain specified levels. This type of agreement would provide
for the basic protection of the investor's initial capital outlay while
maximizing the incentive of the agent to use his skills by investing
in productive ventures.
The compensation arrangement raises important partnership
tax questions. By paying the agent a percentage of profits, he
might be regarded as a partner.23 Assuming that the agency agree-
ment allocates the profits, losses and tax benefits between the par-
ties, the tax consequences should not be affected as this
agreement will control for partnership tax purposes.24 However,
agent has virtually completed the deal. Id. § 454 (1958). However, as the pro-
moter-agent is likely to be paid over the life of the investment this provision
would not be applicable and absent an agreement to the contrary, the agent
would only be entitled to the amounts earned up to that time. Id. § 454, Com-
ment a.
22. Id. § 443(a) provides that the amount of compensation expressly agreed be-
tween the parties will control.
23. See § IV-A of text infra.
24. I.R.C. § 704(a) provides that a "partner's distributive share of income, gain,
loss, deduction or credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
be determined by the partnership agreement." The allocation stated in the
agreement will control unless such agreement lacks "substantial economic
effect." I.R.C. § 704(b) (2). This limitation essentially requires that the alloca-
tion must affect the economic relations of the parties as distinguished from
mere tax consequences. S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3536. See generally 2 MCKEE, supra
note 1, 1 10.02; Allen, Partnership "Retroactive" and "Special" Allocations:
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as the agency may now constitute a general partnership for state
law purposes, the agent, as a general partner, could be individually
liable to the creditors of the "partnership. '25
Secondly, under partnership tax law there is some question as
to whether a '"profits interest" transferred to the promoter-general
partner might be a taxable event at the time of the transfer, rather
than in each subsequent year when the payments are made. In Sol
Diamond26 the Tax Court held that the profits interest from the
partnership was taxable in its entirety in the year of receipt. It is
questionable whether the case has such broad applicability. The
major problem with the immediate taxation of a profits interest is
valuation. The service partner in Sol Diamond had sold his inter-
est for $40,000 less than three months after the partnership agree-
ment was signed. Accordingly, Sol Diamond can arguably be
limited to its facts. In support of this conclusion, there have been a
number of recent decisions which have not followed Sol Diamond.
The Service, in Private Letter Ruling 781708027 stated that a profits
interest to be paid for future services rendered by the general part-
ners to a limited partnership was not recognizable in the year of
the formation of the partnership. Similarly, the Tax Court in Pratt
v. Commissioner28 held that a management fee payable to the gen-
eral partner, based on a percentage of profits of the partnership,
was intended for the payment of future compensation (rather than
for past services rendered) and therefore was not taxable in the
year of the partnership agreement. It is significant that Sol Dia-
mond was not cited in either of these opinions.
A final issue pertaining to the agency agreement is whether
each investor should enter into a separate agreement with the pro-
moter, or whether several investors could sign one contract. As
will be discussed more fully below, where several investors sign
the same agreement, it can be viewed by the Service as another
factor indicating that a partnership was intended by their common
intent to invest in the same transaction. The agency agreement
would then constitute a partnership agreement with the profits
Impact of the Tax Return Act of 1976, 55 TAXES 183 (1977); Comment, New
Restrictions on Tax Shelter Limited Partnerships, 56 NEB. L. REv. 300 (1977).
25. General partners are subject to joint (but not several) liability on all partner-
ship debts. Uniform Partnership Act § 15(b) (1914) [hereinafter cited as
UPA]. In Nebraska, it is codified at NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 67-301 to -343 (Reissue
1976).
26. 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974). See generally Cowan,
Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services:
The Diamond Case, 27 TAx. L. REv. 161 (1972).
27. Priv. Let. Rul. 7817080 (Jan. 27, 1978) (Ruling 3)
28. 64 T.C. 203 (1975), aff'd on this issue, 550 F.2d 1023 (5t Cir. 1977).
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and losses being divided accordingly.2 9 For this reason, it is advis-
able to execute separate agency agreements. Also, any language
linking the relationships should be omitted. This distinction based
on the form of the venture may be more illusory than real, how-
ever, because a partnership can still be held to exist where sepa-
rate agreements are signed and the promoter pools the funds and
uses them in the same ventures. The form is, at best, only one fac-
tor to consider.
IL STATE LAW COMPARISON OF PARTNERSHIP AND
AGENCY
A. Formal Organization Requirements
One of the disadvantages of using a limited partnership is the
initial formalities which are imposed by the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act.30 Section 2 of the ULPA requires that two or more
partners file a statement with the county clerk where the principal
place of the partnership's business is located. Among other things,
the document must disclose the name and location of the business;
the name and location of each general and limited partner; the
value of all contributions made by limited partners; and the share
of profits of each limited partner. In contrast, absent other
statutory filing provisions such as banking or alcohol, agencies are
not subject to any disclosure requirements and investors and pro-
moters are therefore assured of anonymity.
A somewhat obscure but related issue to the organizational re-
quirements of a partnership and agency is the applicability of the
usury laws. Looking at the partnership or agency as an entity, the
initial question is whether it is subject to the usury limitations at
all. In Nebraska, loans to partnerships are specifically excluded
from the eleven percent 3 ' interest rate ceiling.32 However, invest-
ment agencies will be subject to the usury limits because they do
not qualify under any of the stated exceptions. In contrast, it is not
clear that agencies formed in Illinois are subject to the usury
laws.33 The Illinois statutes provide that business loans "to a per-
son owning and operating a business as sole proprietor or to any
29. See note 24 supra.
30. Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916) [hereinafter cited as ULPA]. Only
Louisiana has not adopted the Act. In Nebraska, it is codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 67-201 to -232 (Reissue 1976).
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-101.03 (1978 Cum. Supp.).
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-101.04 (1978 Cum. Supp.) states that "the limitation on
the rate of interest provided in section 45-101.03 shall not apply to: .... (2)
Loans made to any corporation, partnership or trust."
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
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person owning and operating a business as joint venturers.. -34
are exempted from the usury limitations. It is arguable that while
an investment agency should be excepted as a policy matter, it still
might be subject to the limits because it does not fit into the literal
language of the statute. Therefore, if any loans are made to or
from third parties or if the capital investment is treated as a loan to
the promoter-agent, the investor (or third party) in Nebraska and
possibly Illinois, could be subject to the criminal penalty provi-
sions for violation of the usury laws.35
An example of the application of the usury laws to transactions
within the entity is presented in Johns v. Jaeb.3 6 A bank official
personally invested $5,000 in a limited partnership as a limited
partner.37 Although all of the partnership documents were prop-
erly executed and filed, the court held that the unconditional obli-
gation on the part of the general partner to "purchase" the
banker's $5,000 interest at a stated price of $6,500 was in fact a usu-
rious loan.3 8 The court noted that the agreed "purchase price" had
no relation to the actual value of the business and the $5,000 was
not subject to the general risks of the business enterprise.39 As
capital invested in an agency might be regarded as a loan, the obvi-
ous lesson for agency investors is not to require repayment of their
principal investment in an amount which exceeds the permitted
interest rate. Also, as the agency itself may be subject to the usury
limits, the parties should check their applicable state law before
any loans are made to prevent unexpected liability.
B. Control and Rights of Investors
1. Agency vs. General Partnership
In a general partnership all of the partners are regarded both as
principals and as agents for each other.40 The Uniform Partner-
ship Act (UPA) specifically provides that all of the partners will be
34. Id. § 1(c).
35. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-101.07 (1978 Cum. Supp.).
36. .518 S.W.2d 857 (Civ. App. 1974).
37. Id. at 859.
38. Id. at 860.
39. Id.
40. UPA § 9(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-309(1) (Reissue 1976), states that-
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the
partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in
the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a mem-
ber binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the
person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has
no such authority.
1980)
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bound by the individual acts of every other partner.41 The poten-
tial liability is not without limits. Partners will not be liable where
a partner did not have the authority to act on behalf of the partner-
ship and the other party to the transaction had knowledge of the
lack of authority.42 Also, acts of a partner which are beyond the
scope of the usual trade or business of the partnership will not
bind the partnership unless authorized by the co-partners.43 The
UPA states that the partners will be jointly and severally liable for
the wrongful acts of a co-partner but only jointly liable for the
debts and obligations of the partnership." Since the UPA provides
that each partner has an equal right to participate in the manage-
ment of the business, 45 partners must be carefully chosen. Obvi-
ously, the risk of liability increases with the number of general
partners due to their power to bind the partnership.
The agency relationship is similar in that the agent has the
power to contract for the principal and to subject him to personal
liability.4 6 One of the advantages of an agency is that the principal
has a right to state what the agent can and cannot do.4 7 The agent
then has a duty of obedience to follow the instructions of the prin-
cipal.48 Also, the potential risks of the investor-principal can be
minimized through explicit directions in the agency agreement.
As stated above,49 common restrictions include a limitation on the
amount of money which may be borrowed by the agent and an ex-
plicit statement regarding the type of investment activity which is
to be entered into by the agent. If the agent exceeds his authority,
agency law provides that absent a ratification5 0 or the creation of
apparent authority through direct communications between the
principal and the third party,5 1 the principal may be relieved from
responsibility and the agent alone will be personally liable.52
As a specialist in the particular investment field, the agent may
request a two or three-year irrevocable delegation of authority so
as to minimize any "interference" by the investor-principal. In
41. UPA § 9(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-309(1) (Reissue 1976).
42. UPA § 9(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-309(1) (Reissue 1976).
43. UPA § 9(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-309(2) (Reissue 1976).
44. UPA § 15; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-315 (Reissue 1976).
45. UPA § 18(e); NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-318(e) (Reissue 1976).
46. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 7.
47. Id. §§ 1, 14.
48. Id. § 385.
49. See § H1 of text supra.
50. "Ratification is the affirmation by a person of a prior act which did not bind
him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act,
as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 82.
51. See notes 74-76 & accompanying text infra.
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 329.
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view of the general duty of obedience, 53 the agent must follow the
directions of the principal set out in the agency agreement. These
directions will control so long as an illegal purpose is not contem-
plated.5 4 Therefore, an irrevocable delegation of authority can be
made if the parties so agree. In spite of any agreement to the con-
trary, the principal always possesses the power to revoke the au-
thority of an agent at any time.55 The effect, then, of an absolute
delegation of authority would be a reduction in the principal's abil-
ity to interfere in the day-to-day activities of the investment ven-
ture while recognizing that the principal could terminate the
relationship at any time.
An additional factor which appeals to the investment advisor is
that unlike a general partnership,56 a third party generally has no
cause of action against an agent where the principal is disclosed.57
The theory is that the other party is relying on the credit and busi-
ness reputation of the principal, so the identity of the agent is un-
important to the transaction. This exemption from liability is not
absolute however.58 The agent will be personally liable to the third
party when it is specifically provided that the agent is to be named
as a party to the contract.59
2. Agency vs. Limited Partnership
The limited partnership has been the most common form used
in tax shelter investments.60 Its popularity is based in part on the
fact that limited partners are liable only to the extent of their in-
vestments in the partnership.61 The tradeoff for limited liability is
that limited partners may not participate in the management of the
business. 62 While this restriction does not generally present any
problems for the partners from a business standpoint, it can be an
53. Id. § 385.
54. The agent will not be liable to the principal for failure to perform his stated
duties if such duties are illegal. Id. § 411. See also id. § 34, Comment (g).
55. "A statement in a contract that the authority cannot be terminated by either
party is effective only to create liability for its wrongful termination." Id.
§ 118, Comment (b). But see id. § 450.
56. See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 320 states that the agent is not a party to the
contract. The third party then is liable directly to the principal pursuant to
the terms of the contract. Id. § 292.
58. See note 74 & accompanying text infra.
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 146, 293.
60. See note 2 supra.
61. ULPA § 1; NEB. REv. STAT. § 67-201 (Reissue 1976).
62. ULPA § 7 provides that where the limited partner participates in the manage-
ment of the business, he will be subject to personal liability as a general part-
ner. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-207 (Reissue 1976).
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obstacle to maximizing tax benefits.63
All limited partnerships must have a general partner who will
be ultimately liable for the obligations of the partnership.64 If the
promoter has special investment skills, it is very unlikely that he
will agree to be a general partner due to the exposure of personal
liability.65 It will be equally unacceptable under the ULPA to
make the promoter a limited partner because such a partner can
contribute only cash and not services 66 and he may not manage the
enterprise. 67 Under these circumstances where a limited partner-
ship is not available as a practical matter, an agency may be the
only viable alternative in which to set up the investment. Initially,
it appears that the agency investors will have lost all control over
their potential personal liability. However, through the use of in-
surance and debt-limiting language in the agency agreement, the
problem of liability can be resolved. In addition, by forcing the in-
vestor and promoter to deal with the liability issue, the merits of
the investment rather than simply the tax results will be more
carefully analyzed. If losses are ultimately incurred by the agency,
they should be fully deductible against unrelated income of the in-
vestor to the extent of the money invested 68 plus any liabilities if
the investor is personally liable under the "at risk" rules of section
465.69
C. Indemnity for Liabilities to Third Parties
The principal is not liable, absent apparent authority7 O or ratifi-
cation through acceptance of the benefits,7 ' for the acts of an agent
which are not authorized or are beyond the scope of actual author-
ity.7 2 Thus, if the agreement stated that the agent does not have
the authority to borrow funds, but he signs a note purportedly for
the principal, the agent will be personally liable for the debt.73 The
agent's liability is based on a breach of warranty theory, that is, an
implied warranty that he has the authority to bind the principal.
However, the principal will remain liable to the third party where
63. See § IV-E of text infra.
64. "A limited partnership is a partnership formed by two or more persons...
having as members one or more general partners and one or more limited
partners." UPLA § 1; NEB. REv. STAT. § 67-201 (Reissue 1976).
65. Id. § 9; UPA § 15; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-315 (Reissue 1976).
66. ULPA § 4; NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-204 (Reissue 1976).
67. Id. § 7.
68. ILR.C. § 165(c) (2).
69. See § IV-F of text infra.
70. See notes 74-76 & accompanying text infra.
71. See note 50 supra.
72. See note 52 supra.
73. Id.
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the agent has apparent authority to complete the transaction.74
Apparent authority is created where the principal directly notifies
the third party with whom the agent will deal, and asserts that the
promoter is his agent.7 5 In contrast, actual authority is a grant of
authority made directly to the agent.7 6 Therefore, an agent who
has been given apparent authority to deal with a third person
might not have the actual authority to do so under the agency
agreement. Assuming that the acts of the agent are authorized and
the principal is disclosed, the agent will not be liable because he is
not a party to the contract.77 In such a case, the third party will
have a cause of action directly against the principal.78
With respect to tort liability, the principal will be directly liable
in most cases for the tortious conduct of the agent under the the-
ory of respondeat superior if there is a master-servant relation-
ship.7 9 This relationship will not exist if the principal does not
have a right to control the physical acts of the agent.80 The tax
shelter promoter should be regarded as an independent contractor
(and this should be expressly stated in the agreement) because
the investor will lack day-to-day control over his activities.8 1
Therefore, absent direct fault by the investor, any tort liability re-
sulting from the actions of the agent should not be imputed to the
investor-principal. As a practical matter however, a primary con-
cern in any investment is maximizing the protection of the inves-
tors from large liability claims. Not only must the investor be
satisfied of the financial solvency of the agent, but he must analyze
the potential risks inherent in the particular investment. The
probability of an accident and the resultant liability will vary
greatly depending on whether the agency is involved in oil and gas
or in computers. Regardless of the type of investment, and even
74. "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another per-
son by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other,
arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third
persons." RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 8.
75. Id. See id. § 8, Comment (a).
76. Id. See, e.g., System Investment Corp. v. Montview Acceptance Corp., 355
F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1966).
77. See note 57 supra.
78. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§ 144, 149.
79. Id. § 219.
80. Id. § 220.
81. Other factors which will be relevant in the determination of the status of the
agent include: (1) Whether the agent is engaged in a business which is dis-
tinct from the employer; (2) Whether the agent's work is usually done under
the employer's direction or by a specialist without supervision; (3) Whether
the employer supplies a place to work and the tools used; (4) the length of
the employment; (5) whether payment is made by the amount of time spent
or by the job; and (6) the amount of skill necessary to perform the work. Id.
§ 220(2).
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though the investor may not be primarily liable, he should make
sure that the liability limits are adequate and he should receive
copies of all policies and any termination notices directly from the
insurance company.
D. Duty and Liability to Investors
The agent is a fiduciary with respect to the principal.8 2 Implicit
in the role of a fiduciary are certain duties. These include a duty of
care and obedience, 83 a duty to notify the principal of matters af-
fecting the subject of the agency,84 a duty of loyalty which requires
that the agent not compete with the principal without his consent 85
and a duty not to take a position which is in conflict with the princi-
pal's without his prior consent.8 6 The Restatement of Agency pro-
vides that a breach of any of these duties is both a breach of the
agency agreement and a tort based on fraud.87 The principal there-
fore has a number of alternative remedies. Regardless of any per-
sonal gain on the part of the agent, the principal can void the
transaction and terminate the relationship. The principal may also
either sue for violation of the agreement and recover any lost prof-
its, or sue in tort for punitive damages based on bad faith.
While a fiduciary obligation generally cannot be contracted
away, an agent is permitted to compete and act in a manner which
conflicts with the principal with his consent.88 As it is likely that
the promoter-agent will desire to enter into other agency relation-
ships, it should be explicitly stated in all agency agreements that
the principal consents to such activity. Since the partners to a
partnership are both agents and principals,89 the same fiduciary
obligations generally exist as discussed above.
IV. TAX COMPARISON OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
A. Is the Agency a Partnership?
The investment agreement should clearly state that an
"agency" relationship is contemplated by the parties. However, if
certain objective factors exist, the venture will be taxable as a part-
nership irrespective of statements to the contrary.90 This problem
arises due to the broad definition of "partnership" for federal tax
82. Id. § 1.
83. Id. § 379.
84. Id. § 381.
85. Id. § 387.
86. Id. § 394.
87. Id. § 399.
88. Id. §§ 391, 392.
89. See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
90. Raymond W. Schmitz, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 78,317 (1978); Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1
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purposes. 91 Section 761(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
states that "the term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization... which
is not ... a corporation or trust or estate." The Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Culbertson92 ruled that the issue of whether a
partnership exists will not be based on any specific factors but will
be decided according to the true intent of the parties as evidenced
by a consideration of the objective facts.93 Despite the Supreme
Court's disapproval of specific factors to be considered, the Tax
Court in Hubert M. Lunai94 stated that the following factors will be
indicative of partnership status:
The agreement of the parties and their conduct in executing its terms; the
contributions, if any, which each party has made to the venture; the par-
ties' control over income and capital and the right of each to make with-
drawls; whether each party was a principal and coproprietor, sharing a
mutual proprietary interest in the net profits and having an obligation to
share losses, or whether one party was the agent or employee of the other,
receiving for his services contingent compensation in the form of a per-
centage of income; whether business was conducted in the joint names of
the parties; whether the parties filed Federal partnership returns or other-
wise represented to respondent or to persons with whom they dealt that
they were joint venturers; whether separate books of account were main-
tained for the venture; and whether the parties exercised mutual control
over and assumed mutual responsibilities for the enterprise.
9 5
These factors have been condensed into three general prerequi-
sites which must be evident before an agency will be regarded as a
partnership for tax purposes: (1) the business must be formed
with an intent to produce economic profits; (2) such profits must
be shared jointly by the principal and agent; and (3) the persons
sharing the profits must be co-proprietors.9 6 The first two require-
ments will be satisfied where the promoter is compensated on a
percentage of profits basis because profits will clearly be shared
and the promoter has a direct interest in producing more than just
C.B. 569; Haley v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953); Walsh Constr.
Co. v Church, 247 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
91. The statutory definition of a "partnership" is recognized as being much
broader than the common law definition. Hubert F. Baughn, 38 T.C.M. (P-H)
69,282 (1969); Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-3 (1967). For this reason, the common
law or state partnership definition will not control for federal tax purposes.
Burk Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); Hecht v. Malley, 265
U.S. 144 (1924); Rev. Rul. 77-332, 1977-2 C.B. 484. However, state law has been
considered as a factor in determining partnership status for federal income
tax purposes. Haley v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953); Buckley v.
United States, 76-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) § 9473 (W.D. Tex 1976); M.H.S. Co., 45
T.C.M. (P-H) 76,165 (1976), affid, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978).
92. 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
93. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742.
94. 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).
95. Id. at 1077-78.
96. 2 MCKEE, supra note 1, 1 3.02(2).
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"tax profits." The central question then is whether the principal
and agent are co-proprietors. 97 Factors to consider in this determi-
nation include: (1) whether the agent has made a contribution to
capital, thus appearing a co-owner in the venture;98 (2) whether
losses are allocated to the agent; 99 and (3) whether the principal
and agent have mutual control over the venture, including the
right to purchase and sell major assets. 0 0
Employment and agency relationships have presented difficult
problems for the courts because a percentage of profits compensa-
tion plan is a common tool used to provide additional incentives.' 0 '
For this reason, the sharing of profits is not a determinative char-
acteristic in favor of partnership status. 10 2 In Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner,0 3 the taxpayer was involved in a venture called
LACO which engaged in commodities trading.10 4 LACO had de-
vised a plan whereby investors (called "cash participants") agreed
to contribute $50,000 and LACO would use their skill and expertise
to trade in the commodities market. 0 5 The agreement called the
relationship a "joint venture" and stated that, although the futures
contracts were purchased in the name of the investor, LACO and
the investors would hold them as co-owners. 106 Profits and losses
were allocated sixty percent to the investors and forty percent to
LACO and either party had the right to terminate without cause. 10 7
In affirming the Tax Court's decision that LACO and the inves-
tors were not in a partnership, the Eighth Circuit stated that
LACO was performing managerial services and therefore only had
97. Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1967); Estate of Smith v. Com-
missioner, 313 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1963); Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067
(1964); Hartley F. Satnick, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,289 (1978); Ian T. Allison, 45
T.C.M. (P-H) T 76,248 (1976); Paul J. Kelly, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090 (1970); Rev.
Rul. 75-3, 1975-1 C.B. 383.
98. Evans v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 40 (1970), affd, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971),
acq., 1978-2 C.B.2. The Seventh Circuit held that where capital is a material
income-producing factor, a person will be a partner if he owns a capital inter-
est in the partnership. 447 F.2d at 551.
99. Claire A. Ryza, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,064 (1977).
100. Parker v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1355 (1945); Schermerhorn Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 46 B.T.A. 151 (1942); Jesse James Finch, 24 T.C.M. (P-H) 55,179
(1955).
101. See generally Spada & Ruge, Partnerships-Statutory Outline and Definition,
161-2d TAx MNGM'T (BNA) A-16, A-17 (1975).
102. Silling v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 701 (1957), acq., 1971-2 C.B. 3; Maurice Gro-
ber, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 72,240 (1972); Hubert F. Baughn, 38 T.C.M. (P-H)
69,282 (1969); Elizabeth Mayer, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 54,120 (1954).
103. 313 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1963).
104. Id. at 726.
105. Id. at 730.
106. Id. at 730-31.
107. Id. at 731.
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an interest in trading profits rather than an economic interest in
capital.10 This compensatory interest was confirmed by the fact
that LACO's right to withdraw cash was restricted and any capital
remaining upon dissolution was payable only to the investors. 0 9
The court also noted that there was little chance that LACO would
be subject to liability for any trading losses because any losses
would simply be offset against the initial $50,000 investment.110 Fi-
nally, the court held that since LACO had not presented any evi-
dence showing that a partnership was intended to contradict their
interest in being compensated for its services, the intent test of
Culbertson had not been met."'
In Revenue Ruling 75-43,112 the Service ruled on the tax status
of a cattle owner who delivered cattle to a corporate feed lot opera-
tor. The service agreement provided that the operator was to feed
and care for the animals in preparation for market. All feed was to
be purchased from the operator and the cattle were separated from
the other cattle and were separately insured against casualty
losses by the feed lot. The five-year agreement provided that the
owner was to advance $50,000 to maintain the cattle and it specifi-
cally stated that the operator was an independent contractor and
that no partnership was intended. The operator was to receive ten
percent of the owner's net proceeds in compensation for its serv-
ices. Under these terms, the Service held that this arrangement
was not a partnership because: the owner had control over and in
fact owned the cattle; the profits interest was in payment for the
operator's services and facilities; and there was no intent to con-
duct the business as a partnership.
It is apparent, then, that a profits interest in an agency agree-
ment will not automatically classify the agent as a partner. How-
ever, because one factor is not determinative, the following should
not be included in an agency agreement without a careful consid-
eration of the consequences. The agent should not be allocated
any losses from the venture and should not make a contribution to
capital. The investor should be the stated owner of the investment
property and should retain the power to terminate the relationship
at any time. It is also advisable to restrict the agent's power to sell
or dispose of the investment without the investor's consent. Fi-
nally, it is important to, carry out the operation of the investment
as an agency rather than as a partnership. This can be done by not
representing the operation to be a partnership to third parties, by
108. Id. at 732.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 1975-1 C.B. 383.
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keeping separate books and by refraining from any temptation to
file a partnership tax return.113
If the agency is classified as a partnership for federal tax pur-
poses, a partnership tax return must be fied for the taxable
year.114 Since partnership status will typically not be determined
until after the first few years of operation, the past tax returns of
the principal and agent will have to be amended to reflect any
changes in the allocation of income and expenses. Before 1979,
criminal penalties could be imposed for the failure to file a partner-
ship return, and such failure had to have been "willful. u"1 5 The
1978 Act expanded the penalty provisions by adding section 6698.
It provides for a dollar penalty equal to fifty dollars times the
number of partners, for each month that the return was delin-
quent.116 In any event, the penalty cannot be imposed in excess of
five months. 117 Agencies treated as partnerships should escape
the penalty because section 6698(a) (2) provides that the penalty
will not be imposed where there is "reasonable cause" for the fail-
ure to fie the return.
B. Investors as Partners
Even if the individual investor antd the promoter-agent are not
classified as a partnership, caution must be exercised so the inves-
tors will escape classification as being in partnership with each
other. This situation can arise where large amounts of capital are
required to invest in real estate or oil and gas. The promoter,
rather than forming a partnership with the investors, will enter
into separate agencies with each of them, pool their money and
purchase the investment for the investors as tenants in common.
The agent typically does not make a personal investment but will
utilize his skills in managing the property in exchange for a per-
centage of profits.118 As discussed above,119 this scheme appears
to fit neatly into the definition of a partnership under section
113. See generally Halstead v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961); Maletis v.
United States, 200 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952); Jordan K. Smith, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) T
78,416 (1978); McManus v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 197 (1975), aff'd, 583 F.2d 443
(9th Cir. 1978); Richard 0. Wheeler, 47 T C.M. (P-H) 1 78,208 (1978); Ian T.
Allison 45 T.C.M. (P-H) § 76,248 (1976); Estate of McDaniel, 30 T.C.M. (P-H)
§ 61,302 (1961).
114. The return must state the gross income and deductions of the partnership
and "shall include in the return the names and addresses of the individuals
who would be entitled to share in the taxable income if distributed and the
amount of the distributive share of each individual." I.R.C. § 6031.
115. I.R.C. § 7203.
116. I.R.C. § 6698(b).
117. Id.
118. See notes 22-24 & accompanying text supra.
119. See note 91 & accompanying text supra.
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761 (a) as an "unincorporated organization" used for the purpose of
carrying on a business "venture. '120
The regulations do provide some immediate relief.121 While it
reiterates the Code definition of a 'partnership," regulation section
1.761-1(a) provides that "mere co-ownership of property which is
maintained, kept in repair and rented or leased does not constitute
a partnership."'122 Nonetheless, co-ownership may constitute a
partnership, according to the regulation, when a business is ac-
tively conducted and the profits are shared by the owners. 123 The
regulation provides a few examples to clarify the distinction. A
simple lease of farm land in exchange for a set fee or a percentage
of the crops will not be a partnership. However, a partnership will
be created where, in addition to the leasing of apartments, the co-
owners of the building also provide additional services, whether
individually or through their agent. On this basis, co-ownership
will lead to partnership status if, in addition to the performance of
ordinary maintenance and upkeep activities consistent with the
ownership of such property, significant additional services are ren-
dered which indicate the active operation of a business.
The "safe harbor" then, is that any services provided by co-own-
ers or their agents should be limited to the maintenance and direct
leasing of the premises with no "extras" added in. However, in
Revenue Ruling 75-374,124 the Service approved of an ideal method
of circumventing partnership status while rendering additional
services to the tenants. An insurance company and a real estate
investment trust were undivided one-half owners of an apartment
complex. They selected an unrelated agent to manage the prop-
erty whose duties included renting and maintaining the apart-
ments and paying all of the expenses of operation including taxes
and insurance. Additional expenses included the cost of unat-
tended parking, water, heat, air conditioning and garbage service,
which were furnished to the tenants at no extra charge. The
agent's compensation which was paid equally by each co-owner
was a percentage of the operating gross profits from the apartment
complex. In order to provide additional services to the tenants, the
agent was authorized to furnish at additional expense attended
120. Id.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a), T.D. 7208, 1972-3 C.B. 396.
122. Id. at 397. See generally John McShain; 68 T.C. 154 (1977); Lena Hahn, 22 T.C.
212 (1954); Lulu Luna Powell, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 67,032 (1967); Charles E. Tib-
bals, 27 T.C.M. (P-H) 58,044 (1958); Almy Gilford, 21 T.C.M. (P-H) 52,049
(1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1953); Priv. Let. Rul. 7826012 (March 28,
1978); Priv. Let. Rul. 7743024 (July 27, 1977), amended, Priv. Let. Rul. 7803060
(Oct. 27, 1977).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1-761-1(a), T.D. 6500, 7208, 1972-2 C.B. 396.
124. 1975-2 C.B. 261.
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parking, covered patios and other utilities such as electricity. The
agent was solely liable for the costs of these optional features and
all profits were retained by the agent as additional compensation
for its efforts. In holding that the two investors would not be
treated as partners for tax purposes, the Service recognized that
the investors themselves were only providing services related to
the maintenance of the complex. They were not rendering addi-
tional services through their agent because the agent alone was
responsible for the cost of such services and would realize all of
the profits from them.
If a promoter desires to pool the contributions of many inves-
tors in order to make a major investment such as into an apart-
ment building, a number of guidelines should be considered.
Separate agency agreements should be executed which authorize
the purchase of the investment and enumerate the management
duties of the promoter. Each investor should have the right to ter-
minate the agency and there should not be any requirements that
an agency interest can be sold only upon a majority vote of the
other investors. Any on-going business activity should be carried
on solely by the agent as described in Revenue Ruling 75-374. Title
to the property should list the owners of the undivided interests
and separate accounts should be maintained for each investor. Fi-
nally, if the agency owns separate assets, such as cattle (as op-
posed to an undivided interest in an oil and gas or real estate
venture), they should be separated from other cattle and kept in
their own area. If for some reason these guidelines are not fol-
lowed and the venture is classified as a partnership, relief is avail-
able because the investors are permitted to elect out of Subchapter
K.125
C. Electing out of Partnership Status
If an agency is held to be taxable as a partnership, section
761(a) allows the members to elect to be excluded from Sub-
chapter K.126 Section 761 (a) states that only two types of unincor-
porated organizations qualify for exclusion: one which is used for
investment purposes or one which involves "the joint production,
extraction, or use of property .... ,127 In order to elect out, the
members of the organization must be able adequately to deter-
mine their income without having to compute partnership taxable
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a) (2), T.D. 7208, 10-3-72. See § IV-C of text infra.
126. The procedural requirements for electing out are set forth in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.761-2(b), T.D. 7208, 10-3-72. See generally Heller, Electing Exclusionfrom
the Partnership Provisions: Safety Valve for Co-Owners, 56 TAXES 330 (1978).
127. I.R.C. § 761(a) (1) & (2); Treas. Reg. 1.761-2(a) (2) & (3), T.D. 7208, 1972-2 C.B.
396.
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income. Also, the election is not available to an association taxable
as a corporation.12 8
As a practical matter, the members of the typical agency will
not qualify as one of the two types of organizations which may
elect out. The stumbling block for agencies is that the regulations
state that in order to elect out as an investing partnership, the par-
ticipants must be co-owners of the property.129 The second cate-
gory, involving the joint extraction or use of property, similarly
requires that the participants "own the property as co-owners, ei-
ther in fee or under lease or other form of contract granting exclu-
sive operating rights .... ,,130 This second category for exclusion
has generally been used by oil and gas or mining activities.131 For
this reason, the language "or other form of contract granting exclu-
sive rights" is aimed at the situation where the participants obtain
an operating lease together from a third party rather than in the
form of a contract from one participant as owner to the other as
operator. Although the meaning of the above-stated language
might be applicable to a tax shelter agency with a separate owner
and operator, the safe route is to carefully structure the agency
relationship so as to avoid partnership status entirely.
D. Association Taxable as a Corporation
Another potential trap for the agency form is the possibility of
being classified as an association taxable as a corporation.132 The
regulations state that an "association" is an organization which
has the essential characteristics of a corporation.133 The character-
istics to be used in this determination are: centralization of man-
agement; continuity of life; limited liability; and free transferability
of interest.134 If the agency has more than two of these qualities,
then it will be an association taxable as a corporation. Absent
unique provisions to the contrary, the tax shelter agency will lack
at least three of these characteristics.
The agency will not have continuity of life because the death or
expulsion of the agent will cause the termination of the relation-
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a) (1), T.D. 7208, 1972-2 C.B. 397.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a) (2) (i), T.D. 7208, 1972-2 C.B. 397.
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a) (3) (i), T.D. 7208, 1972-2 C.B. 397.
131. 2 McKEE, supra note 1, 3.05(1), n.108.
132. Fisher, Classification Under Section 7701-The Past, Presen; and Prospects
for the Future, 30 TAx LAw. 627 (1977); Koch, Limited Partnerships-Tax Sta-
tus as Partnerships or Associations, 76-7 TAx MGT. MEMO. 3 (1976); Sexton &
Osteen, Classification as a Partnership or As An Association Taxable as a
Corporation, 24th TUL. TAx INsT. 95 (1975).
133. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1967), amended, T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
134. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1967), amended, T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
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ship.135 In addition, although the agency agreement may state that
it is to last for a period of years, section 301.7701-2(b) (3) of the reg-
ulations provides that irrespective of such agreement, if any per-
son has the power to dissolve the agency, as the principal does, 136
then continuity of life does not exist. With respect to centraliza-
tion of management, the regulations specifically state that this fac-
tor is not present "when the centralized authority is merely to
perform ministerial acts as an agent at the direction of a princi-
pal."' 37 Finally, since the principal will remain personally liable to
the creditors of the agency, 13 8 the element of limited liability is not
a characteristic of an agency relationship. While the agency form
will not fall within the association provisions, it does not present
any significant advantages over a limited partnership. The regula-
tions state that limited partnerships formed under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act will generally not be associations, as they
lack continuity of life 139 and will not have limited liability,140 ab-
sent a corporate general partner with no substantial assets.141
E. The Agency as a Farm Syndicate
If the tax shelter agency is formed to invest in cattle or other
farm related activity, section 464 may operate to severely limit the
tax advantages of such investment. 42 Essentially, it prevents the
shifting of substantial amounts of unrelated income, where cattle
are purchased and the cost of feed is prepaid and deducted in year
one while the cattle are fed and sold in year two, with the income
being reported in the following year. Specifically, section 464
states that "farm syndicates" cannot deduct feed expenses (or
other farm supplies) except in the year in which the feed is actu-
ally used.143 Also, the cost of poultry held for the laying of eggs
must be capitalized over their life or twelve months, whichever is
less. 4 4 If poultry is purchased for resale, then the costs are de-
ductible only in the year of sale.145 Farm syndicate includes any
organization other than a corporation: (1) which has offered inter-
ests for sale which have been registered pursuant to state or fed-
135. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
136. See note 55 & accompanying text supra.
137. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1) (3) (1967), amended, T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
138. See note 46 & accompanying text supra.
139. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (3) (1967), amended, T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
140. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(d) (1) (1967), amended, T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
141. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(d)(2) (1967), amended, T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
142. See note 2 supra.
143. LR.C. § 464(a).
144. I.R.C. § 464(b)(1).
145. I.R.C. § 464(b) (2).
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eral securities law;146 or (2) which allocates thirty-five percent or
more of the losses to limited partners or limited entrepreneurs. 147
The Code further provides five categories of taxpayers whose in-
terest will be excluded from the thirty-five percent test, but these
exceptions are narrow in scope and do not present any great "loop-
hole" for non-farming investors.148
The key to the continued viability of the agency as opposed to
the limited partnership in tax shelter farm investments lies in the
definition of "limited entrepreneur." Section 464(e) (2) states that
a "limited entrepreneur" is meant to include a person who is not a
limited partner and does not actively participate in the manage-
ment of the farming enterprise. The 1976 Committee Report out-
lined a number of factors which will be considered in the
determination of whether the principal-investor actively partici-
pates in the venture. 49 Factors supporting active participation in-
clude the making of decisions involving the management and the
operation of the farm, actually living or working on the farm, or the
direct hiring and firing of employees rather than such power only
over the farm manager. Factors illustrating a lack of participation
include little control over management and operation of the farm,
having the power only to fire the farm manager rather than the
146. I.R.C. § 464(c) (1) (A).
147. IR.C. § 464(c) (1) (B).
148. I.R.C. § 464(c) (2) states that individuals falling within one of these five cate-
gories willinot be regarded as a limited partner or limited entrepreneur for
the purposes of the 35% test in section 464(c) (1) (B):
(A) in the case of any individual who has actively participated
(for a period of not less than 5 years) in the management of any trade
or business of farming, any interest in a partnership or other enter-
prise which is attributable to such active participation,
(B) in the case of any individual whose principal residence is on
a farm, any partnership or other enterprise engaged in the trade or
business of farming such farm,
(C) in the case of any individual who is actively participating in
the management of any trade or business of farming or who is an
individual who is described in subparagraph (A) or (B), any partici-
pation in the further processing of livestock which was raised in such
trade or business (or in the trade or business referred to in subpara-
graph (A) or (B)),
(D) in the case of an individual whose principal business activ-
ity involves active participation in the management of a trade or
business of farming, any interest in any other trade or business of
farming, and
(E) any interest held by a member of the family (or a spouse of
any such member) of a grandparent of an individual described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) if the interest in the partnership
or the enterprise is attributable to the active participation of the indi-
vidual described in subparagraph (A),(B),(C), or (D).
149. STAFF OF JoINT Comm. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL ExPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 537 (Committee Print 1976), reprinted
in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B. 549.
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employees individually, having a manager who is an independent
contractor rather than an employee and being subject only to lim-
ited liability for farm losses.
With these factors in mind, the agency agreement can be
drafted so as to provide for material participation on the part of the
investor in order to avoid the farm syndicate rules. The agreement
should state that the investor will make regular visits to inspect
the farm or ranch and the agent's power to sell the investment
should be restricted. Also, the decisions relating to the manage-
ment and operation of the investment should be made by the in-
vestor and not the agent. If the investment was in cattle, typical
instructions to the agent include the weight and color of the heifers
and the date and location of the feed lot where the purchase is to
be made. Finally, the investor alone would have the authority to
hire and fire employees.
There are two problems which are readily apparent. First, it
has been assumed throughout this comment that the agent is a
specialist in the particular investment field and will demand a cer-
tain amount of autonomy in order to use his skills.150 Therefore, it
may be very difficult to find an agent who would agree to all of
these above-stated conditions. Second, remembering the time-
worn "substance over form"'151 argument, it would be difficult to
argue that a New York orthopedic surgeon has the requisite knowl-
edge and time to actively manage a cattle feeding operation. How-
ever, if the doctor has some prior experience in the particular
investment area his or her participation obviously becomes more
meaningful.
F. The "At Risk" Rules
The primary benefit of tax shelter investments in past years
was the ability to invest small amounts of cash and borrow large
amounts of capital on a nonrecourse note.152 Although not subject
to personal liability, the investor could deduct losses up to the total
cost of the investment against unrelated income. In 1976, the at-
tractiveness of the tax shelter was reduced with the enactment of
section 465. It provides that losses arising from investments in mo-
tion pictures, farming, equipment leasing, and oil and gas 53 are
deductible only to the extent the investor is "at risk.' 54 The
150. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
151. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
152. See notes 1-2 supra.
153. I.R.C. § 465(c) (1). After 1978, section 465 will apply to all activities engaged in
as a trade or business or for the production of income. I.R.C. § 465(c) (3).
154. I.R.C. § 465(b).
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amount "at risk" essentially equals the amount of cash or adjusted
basis of property contributed, plus the amount of any loans for
which such investor remains personally liable. 55
If the investment was made by a partnership, the application of
the loss limitation rules was not restricted to the four activities
mentioned in section 465. Prior to 1979, section 704(d) provided
that losses were only deductible by partners to the extent of their
adjusted basis in the partnership. However, a partner's basis was
not increased by any liability regardless of the investment if the
partner was not subject to personal liability. 56 Accordingly, an in-
vestor could form an agency and invest in an activity other than
the four mentioned in section 465 and still deduct losses to the ex-
tent of all nonrecourse loans. Under the partnership form, section
704(d) would clearly limit those losses.
This distinct advantage of an agency relationship was struck
down in the Revenue Act of 1978.157 Section 201 of the act ex-
tended the at-risk rules so that they now apply to any activity car-
ried on as a part of a trade or business or for the production of
income. Activities which remain excluded from the purview of
section 465 are investments in real property'58 and section 1245
equipment leasing carried on by a closely held corporation (corpo-
rations in which at least fifty percent of the stock is owned by five
or fewer persons).159 In addition, the Act repealed the last two
sentences of section 704(d) as they duplicated the expanded appli-
cation of the "at risk" rules.
G. The Flow of Tax Benefits
While tax benefits derived from the investment flow through to
both the partner and the principal, there are certain dollar limita-
tions that are imposed at the partnership level, thus making an
agency more attractive. Section 179 permits an additional first
year depreciation deduction for property used in a trade or busi-
ness or held for the production of income equal to twenty percent
up to a cost of $10,000 for single taxpayers and $20,000 for married
taxpayers. Section 179(d) (8) provides that these limitations are to
apply at both the partnership and partner level. Therefore, the
partners must divide the $2,000 deduction among them. If one
partner has first year depreciation deductions attributable to other
property up to the maximum amounts, then his share of the part-
155. Id.
156. I.R.C. § 704(d).
157. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, tit. VII, § 201, 92 Stat. 2815 (1978).
158. I.R.C. § 465(c) (3) (D) (i).
159. I.R.C. § 465(c) (3) (D) (ii).
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nership depreciation will not be deductible by that partner.160
Even if the partners do not deduct their share of the depreciation,
the basis of the partnership property is still reduced by the full
amount of the excess depreciation claimed by the partnership.161
In contrast, if an agency was formed, each investor would be enti-
tled to claim a first year depreciation deduction of $2,000, or $4,000
if married.
Section 48 limits the cost of used section 38 property for invest-
ment tax credit purposes to a maximum of $100,000.162 The regula-
tions state that this limit is applied at both the partnership and
partner levels.163 Each partner would therefore only be entitled to
a distributive share of the credit up to the $100,000 maximum at the
partnership level even though five partners may have purchased
$500,000 worth of used equipment. With an agency each investor
would compute the investment tax credit individually up to the
$100,000 cost limitation.
H. Limitations on Investment Interest
Section 163(d) limits the amount of investment interest which
can be deducted to $10,000 plus the amount by which investment
income exceeds expenses. 164 For the purposes of computing the
interest limitations for partnerships, the determination is made at
the partner level according to each partner's distributive share of
interest and income and expenses. 165 As the dollar limits are not
applied at the partnership level, there is no advantage to be gained
by using an agency. In fact, if a taxpayer and his immediate family
own fifty percent or more of a partnership (or corporation),166 the
interest limit is raised to the lesser of $15,000 or the amount of in-
terest paid annually on a liability incurred in the initial purchase
of the partnership.167 Assuming an interest rate of twelve percent,
an investor should consider forming a partnership, rather than an
agency, if $90,000 or more is to be borrowed in order to deduct the
additional investment interest.
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(d) (1), T.D. 6507, 1960-2 I.R.B 91, amended, T.D. 6579, 1961-
2 I.R.B. 54 and T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 291.
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(d) (2) ex.(1), T.D. 6507, 1960-2 I.R.B. 97, amended, T.D.
6579, 11-7-61 and T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 291.
162. I.R.C. § 48(c) (2) (A).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-3(c) (3), T.D. 6731, 1964-1 I.R.B. 11, amended, T.D. 7181, 1972-1
C.B. 291.
164. I.R.C. § 163(d) (1) (B).
165. I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B). A partner's distributive share will be determined by
the partnership agreement unless it lacks "substantial economic effect".
I.R.C. § 704(a) & (b). See note 24 supra.
166. I.R.C. § 163(d) (7) (B).
167. I.R.C. § 163(d) (7) (A).
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I. Tax Elections
Elections affecting the tax treatment of the partnership and its
assets are made by the partnership and not the partners.168 A list
of the more common elections includes the choice of a permissible
method of accounting, 169 the method of computing depreciation on
partnership property, 7 0 a section 179 election to deduct additional
first year depreciation, an election to deduct intangible drilling and
development costs under section 263(c) and the choice of the taxa-
ble year of the partnership.171 These elections can present special
problems for partners. As an example, where a partner has
elected to deduct the maximum additional first year depreciation
on assets owned individually, the portion of section 179 additional
depreciation on partnership assets allocable to him will be in ex-
cess of the limit. Not only will such partner lose the deduction, but
the basis of the partnership assets will be reduced by the amount
of the depreciation regardless of its deductibility at the partner
level. 172 If any of the partners have adopted tax years other than
on a calendar basis, the choice of a partnership taxable year will be
a difficult task. Under section 706(b), the principal partners (de-
fined as those having a five percent interest in capital or profits) 173
may not have a tax year different from the partnership. The princi-
pal partners must therefore agree on a taxable year and the non-
conforming principal partners will be required to change their
personal tax years. As an additional burden, if the partners
change from a calendar year, the permission of the Commission is
required.174 These problems are totally avoided if an agency rela-
tionship is used by each investor.
J. Organization Fees
The organization fees incident to the formation of a partnership
may be amortized over not less than sixty months if an election is
made by the partnership under section 709(b).175 Any expenses
incurred in the formation of the agency relationship may not be
amortized over a period of years but must be deducted in the year
incurred. This factor may or may not be a disadvantage to an
agency, depending on the particular tax position of the investor-
principal.
168. I.R.C. § 703(b).
169. I.R.C. § 446(c).
170. I.R.C. § 167(b).
171. I.R.C. § 706(b) (1).
172. See note 152 & accompanying text supra.
173. IMR.C. § 706(b) (3).
174. I.R.C. § 442.
175. I.R.C. § 709(b) (1).
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V. CONCLUSION
The agency form is a viable alternative to the more frequently
used limited partnership. It may be selected where the investor
does not want to be involved with others as partners and desires
the flexibility of being able to change the risk factor or tax objec-
tives without the consent of other investors. If the promoter is
highly competent in the investment area, an agency may be used
simply because the promoter does not want to be subject to Habil-
ity as a general partner in a limited partnership. In addition, the
promoter may not want to personally invest any money in the ven-
ture. The agency can also yield significant tax advantages such as
the possible escape from the farm syndicate rules and the realiza-
tion of maximum deductions on certain items which have dollar
limitations such as additional first year depreciation and invest-
ment tax credit on used equipment.
As with all other forms, the agency does have its drawbacks. It
generally cannot be utilized with small amounts of money and
minimum investments of $25,000 to $50,000 are often required. The
investor-principal is not completely shielded from tort liability but
the risk will depend on the type of investment. There is always the
possibility that the agency may be regarded as a partnership be-
tween the investor and promoter or between the investors them-
selves. The success of an agency investment will depend a great
deal on the quality of the promoter and potential investors should
inquire into his personal qualifications and into the financial status
of past investments. Finally, investors should not participate in
any investment until they consult outside sources to determine the
quality of the particular investment itself.
Fred T. Witt, Jr. '79
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